A special situation is an asset whose value depends less on the market than on a process: a court-supervised resolution, a government sale, a regulatory reset. In India these processes now recur often enough to be treated as a category, and our view is that they are won or lost on execution. The valuation model is the easy part. Getting through the process with the asset intact is the work.
Five kinds of situation, one shared structure
The term covers a lot of ground, so it helps to be specific. In India today the situations that matter most fall into five groups.
- Stressed assets resolved under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, where a committee of creditors chooses among resolution plans and the National Company Law Tribunal approves one.
- Strategic sales of public enterprises, run through the Department of Investment and Public Asset Management, where control and management pass to a private owner.
- Asset monetisation, where the government transfers operating rights in existing infrastructure for a fixed term, as in the National Monetisation Pipeline.
- Regulatory resets, where a change of rules alters the economics of a sector and incumbents and entrants must re-plan.
- Carve-outs, where a business inside a larger group or public body is separated into an entity that can be owned and run on its own.
What they share is a structure. The asset has real operating value, but that value sits behind a process that someone else controls and that involves the state: a tribunal, a ministry, a regulator, a licensing authority. The buyer does not set the timetable. That single fact explains most of what follows.
Why these processes are slow, and what that does to pricing
Take the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code first. The statute sets a clock for resolution, and many cases have run well past it, because decisions of the committee of creditors can be appealed and because disputes over claims and statutory dues move through the tribunal and the appellate tribunal on their own schedule. Section 29A adds another layer. It bars certain categories of person, including defaulting promoters, from submitting a plan, so a bidder has to diligence its own eligibility, and that of its consortium partners, as carefully as it diligences the target.
Public enterprise sales run on a different sequence. There is a cabinet decision in principle, an alternative mechanism of ministers to approve the terms, a transaction adviser, a valuation, bids, and then clearances. These can include land records, state government consents, pension and employee liabilities and, above certain thresholds, the Competition Commission of India. Each step has an owner, and the owners do not report to each other.
The stakeholder maps are long. A single power plant or mine may involve lenders, operational creditors, workmen, tax authorities, a state utility that buys the output, a state government that granted the lease and a local community with views on all of the above. A plan that satisfies the first three parties and ignores the rest will stall.
In a special situation the delay is not a discount to the price. It is the main variable, and its distribution has a long tail.
This is where we part ways with the common approach, which prices these deals as financial engineering with a haircut for time. A bid that works only if approvals arrive on schedule is a hope, not a bid. The sounder method is to model the asset under slow, contested and partial outcomes, and to bid only where it still makes sense in the slow case.
What operators and capital each have to bring
Operators come first, because in most of these situations the asset deteriorates while the process runs. Plants idle, contracts lapse, good managers leave. An operator that can walk in on the first day with a plan for the workforce, the suppliers and the customers keeps the value that the process would otherwise erode. The plan also helps inside the process. A committee of creditors or an evaluation panel is easier to persuade when the bidder can show how the business will actually be run.
Capital has a narrower job: to be patient, and to be structured for patience. Borrowing that depends on a closing date is a liability here. So is a fund life shorter than the likely litigation. Capital that can fund through an appeal, and has agreed in advance what it will and will not pay for, holds a real advantage in a market where many bidders cannot wait.
A third requirement is discussed less often: fluency with the state as a counterparty. Officials in these processes work under audit and vigilance review, and their decisions are examined years later, often by people who were not in the room. A counterparty that documents its assumptions, asks for decisions in writing and does not mistake caution for obstruction tends to reach closing. One that treats the state as an adversary to be managed usually does not.
We hold a view that some will contest. As the simpler, better understood assets are worked through, what remains will be messier, and we expect operating credibility to count for more than the last increment of price in how bids are judged. Capital without an operator in these situations is a litigation position with a balance sheet.
Three things are on our watch list. The first is whether monetisation moves beyond assets with predictable cash flows, such as roads and transmission lines, toward assets that carry real operating risk. The second is how long resolutions take in practice. The third, and the open problem, is tribunal capacity. A process that takes years to conclude is one in which the asset keeps losing value, and no bidder can fix that from the outside.