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Indigenisation is industrial policy, not import substitution

Capability built around anchor orders and qualification cycles works where import substitution failed: it rewards suppliers, not producers.

Indigenisation works when a large buyer commits to purchase and gives the supply base enough time to qualify. Old import substitution failed because it protected producers without giving them a demanding customer. The difference between the two is most of the argument, and it decides which of today's programmes will produce industries and which will produce announcements.

What import substitution got wrong

From the 1950s, India protected domestic industry with high tariffs, import licensing and reserved capacity. The protection was against imports. Nobody was obliged to buy what the protected firm made, and in practice the buyers were captive: user industries paid more for inputs that were often worse than what was available abroad. Capacity grew. Competitiveness mostly did not. The reforms from 1991 onward dismantled much of this, and the lesson drawn was that wanting domestic capability was itself the mistake.

We think that conclusion is wrong. The public sector built a real engineering and research base that the country still depends on. The error was to shield the producer rather than reward the supplier. A firm that is paid to deliver against a specification, on a date, to a customer that can reject the delivery, learns things that a firm behind a tariff wall never has to learn.

Anchor demand is the mechanism

Current policy is built differently. In defence, the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 gives top priority to the Buy (Indian-IDDM) category, equipment that is indigenously designed, developed and manufactured. The ministry has notified several positive indigenisation lists: items the services and defence public sector units will buy only from domestic sources after a stated date. That date is the important part. It converts a policy preference into a demand signal that a private firm can raise capital against.

Innovations for Defence Excellence, or iDEX, attacks the other end. The Defence Innovation Organisation publishes problem statements from the services and funds start-ups and small firms to answer them. It is a good way to produce prototypes. Whether it produces industry depends on what follows a successful trial, and a prototype without a procurement path is a well-funded demonstration.

Electronics shows the same logic with a different instrument. The production-linked incentive scheme for large-scale electronics manufacturing pays on incremental sales of goods made in India, so it rewards output and not simply the presence of a factory. The phased manufacturing programme for mobile handsets raised the local content requirement in steps, pulling in components and sub-assemblies over time. The India Semiconductor Mission extends the approach to fabrication, assembly and test, and to chip design through a design-linked incentive.

A list of items to be indigenised is a plan; a multi-year order against that list is a market.

Qualification cycles and supplier depth decide the outcome

The hard part is slow and unglamorous. A component for a military aircraft or a naval system has to be tested, certified and accepted before it is installed. Military airworthiness is certified by CEMILAC, and quality assurance for much of the services' stores sits with the Directorate General of Quality Assurance. A new supplier can spend years in qualification, with a first order that is small and a working capital need that is not. Many capable firms drop out in this gap.

Supplier depth is the second constraint. Final assembly in India is the visible part. Underneath it sit castings, forgings, special alloys, precision machining, printed circuit boards, connectors, sensors and software. An assembly line that imports its sub-assemblies has moved the last step of the process into the country, not the capability. We would judge any indigenisation programme by value added at the second and third tier, and we are sceptical of labels that count the assembly step alone.

Three things make anchor demand work in practice, and each is a design choice, not a hope:

  • Orders are multi-year, with volume visibility long enough to justify tooling and a qualification effort.
  • Design authority sits in India, so that maintenance, upgrades and exports are not hostage to a foreign licensor.
  • Qualification is predictable in time and cost, so that a small supplier can plan a cash runway around it.

What we are watching

The test of the positive indigenisation lists is conversion: whether items on a list turn into contracts on the stated dates, and whether the contracts reach beyond the large prime contractors to the smaller firms that make the parts. The test in electronics is harder. Much of the value in a phone or a server sits in chips, displays and other components that India does not yet make at scale. Assembly incentives have been effective at building the assembly step. Whether they pull the component base in behind them within a decade is, in our view, still an open question.

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